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I. ISSUES IN REPLY BRIEF 
AppellantiCross-Respondent replies to the first four issues addressed in 
Respondeilt/Cross-Appellant's brief. Those issues are: 
A. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF SPECIFIC PEEWORMANCE 
WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
B. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE OPTION WAS 
EXERCISED AT THE APRIL 11 HEARING WAS SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
C. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE OPTION WAS 
VALIDLY EXERCISED ON JUNE 15 WAS A CORRECT APPLICATION OF 
THE LAW. 
D. WHETHER THE ATTORNEY FEE STATUTES ARE APPLICABLE IN THIS 
CASE WHICH SEEKS TO ACQUIRE REAL PROPERTY FOR A FAMILY 
LEGACY. 
11. REPLY ARGUMENTS 
A. ENFORCEMENT OF TI-IE OPTION WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 




One legal standard for enforcelnent of a land sale contract is that the contract ~ttust have 
the essential terms of an agreement. Snyder v. 1W;i7ii:er, 134 Idaho 585 at 587, 6 P.3d 835 at 837 
(Ct. App. 2000). Respondent's brief argues that tlte Gasser/Justad agreement contains all 
essential terms. But at least two essentiai terms are lacking. 
a. 
On essential term is the manner of payment. Dmte  v. Golas, 121 Idaho 149 at 152, 823 
P.2d 183 at 186 (Ct. App. 1992). The GasserIJustad agreement, however, says only that the 
purchase price "shall be payable in e ~ u a l  a~lrtual installments front the date of exercise of said 
Option over a ten (10) year period ..." and that tlte consideration paid for the option ($100.00) 
"shall be applied against the purchase price." (Ex. A. p.1) The time for beginning the 
installments is not expressed 
Tlte trial court held that the first installment was due after the option was exercised, i.e., 
April 11, 2006. (Tr. p. 121, LL 9-18) Apparently the court construed the parties' language 
"payable ... from tlte date of exercise" to mean "due on the date of exercise." Such a holding 
converted the parties' ten-year contract to a nine-year contract. Clearly the trial court created an 
essential term to which the parties themselves had not agreed.' 
b. 
Another essential term should be the method of conveying title to the real prope~ly. A 
decision of the Idaho Supreme Court reveals the indispensability of this term. 
Hoffnzan v. S V Con~yany, Inc., 102 Idaho 187, 628 P.2d 218 (1981), decided the 
adequacy of a writing to support an oral agreement to sell real property. Because the parties had 
orally agreed to iristalllnent payments of the purchase price and because the proffered 
menlorandun1 lacked that provision, the writing was insufficient to overcome the statute of 
frauds. 
Where the parties intended deferred payments, the terms and 
conditions of the credit transaction lilust be set forth in the 
memorandum. 
The GasseriJustad option agreement presents a situation analogous to that in Hoffman. 
The option agreement shows that the parties intended deferred payments, but the terms and 
conditions of that credit transaction are not stated. It may be that the Gassers and the Justads 
both contemplated a contract for deed transaction similar to that created by the trial court, or one 
or both of them may have wanted a deed from Gassers to be simultaneously excha~iged for a 
Although Claire testified to her understandirig of ivlien the first payment was due, (Tr. p. 28, LL 2-6) she did not 
testify that that was part of the agreement, and one party's subjective imderstandins is immaterial to the 
interpretation of a contract. J.R. Sbiiplot Co. v. Bose~i, 144 Idaho GI 1 at -, 167 P.3d 849 at 751 (2006). 
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promissory note from Justad. Terms so essential to the perforn~ance of this tral~saction were 
never agreed upon by the parties. 
By the legal standard in Hoffman the GasserIJustad agreement cannot be enforced 
because terms and conditions of the credit transaction are not set forth. 
2. 
(Implied Terms) 
The legal standard for implying terms to a contract is that those terms should be 
necessary to effectuate the parties' intention and that those terms should be reasonable. Davis v. 
Profissioriai Busir7ess Services, Inc., 109 Idaho 8 10 at 8 13- 14, 712 P.2d 5 1 1 at 5 14-15 ( 2  985). 
Failure to follow this standard in a land sale transaction can result in the trial court rewriting the 
parties' contract. &,Snyder. v. Miniver, 134 Idaho 585 at 586. 6 P.3d 835 at 838, n. 2 (Ct. App. 
2000). 
a. 
The trial court's imposition of a contract for deed transaction did not effectuate the 
parties' intention because their intention was unknolvn. 
In creating this implied term the court relied, at least in pan, on the contract for sale of 
1 13 acres, which the parties had entered in 1978. (Tr. p. 125: LL 2 1-24; p. 132, LL 1-7) At the 
time of that contract there had been no course of dealings between the parties; so that cannot be a 
basis for imposing that type of transaction. Nor can it be inferred that they intended the same 
type of transaction. The sale contract reveals that the parties knew how to create a contract for 
deed when they so intended. Their on~ission of pro\ isions for a contract for deed in the option 
agreement could mean that they did not want one. 
It is not insignificant that the acreage in the contract for sale is considerably larger than 
that covered by the option. Nor is i t  unimportant that the real property sub,ject to the option 
agreement included a residence. That the parties thought i t  appropriate to convey 113 acres of 
vacant land by contract for deed does not mean they intended the same sort of transaction for the 
sale of ten acres that includes a residence. 
b. 
The sale transaction created by the trial court contains unreasonable terms. 
(i) 
One of the trial court's implied terms allows Claire Justad 30 days after written notice to 
cure a default in payments. (Tr. p. 130, L. 25; p. 131. LI, 1-3; R. p. 133) The judgment is silent 
on what Ron Ward can do if default continues beyond the 30-day period. The court's decision 
stated that if "Claire is late on a payment, she loses her rights under the contract" (Tr. p. 123, LL 
16-18) and that the "Estate can bring proceedings to place her in that position." (Tr. p. 131, LL 
12-13) There is no provision for redress if Claire fails to pay the property taxes, however. 
Two things can readily be presumed about the sale transaction created by the trial court. 
The buyer has no personal liability to pay the purchase price and the seller has no clear remedy 
in the event of default. The trial court devised an unl.easonable sale transaction. 
(ii) 
The deed of conveyance, which is to be a quitclaim from the personal representative, is lo 
be prepared and delivered after the entire purchase price is paid. (Tr. p. 123, LL 10-18) This 
would be as late as April 11, 2015, requiring the probate estate to be kept open u~itil that date. 
The reasonableness of that implied term is also questionable. 
The trial court's granting specified enforcement of an option agreement, which lacked 
essential terms and to which the court inlplied urlreasonable terms, was an abuse of discretion. 
B. THE FINDING THAT THE OPTION WAS EXERCISED AT THE APIUL 11 
HEARING IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The writer of this brief cannot find any evidence in the record that Claire Justad's agent 
exercised the option during the probate hearing on April 11, and Respondent has not identified 
any such evidence. Instead, Respondent argues that Claire intended to exercise the option at the 
April 11 hearing, that Ron Ward knew of this i~ltention, and that these facts either singularly and 
jointly constitute the giving of notice 
1. 
(Intention Is Not Enough) 
I11 Slzellhart v. Axford, 485 P.2d 1031 (Wn. 1971), the plaintiff wrote a letter stating he 
was going to exercise the option before its deadline. He failed to do so, and the court denied his 
action for specific perforlr~ance. 111 that decision the Supreme Court of Washington said, "an 
attempt to give notice is not the same as giving notice." 485 1'.2d at 1032. That rule applies in 
this case to the actions of Claire's agent at the April 11 hearing. At most, Claire's agent intended 
to give notice, but she did not do so. An option is an irrevocable offer to for111 a contract. 
Danziano v. Finney, 93 Idaho 482 at 485, 464 P.2d 522 at 525 (1970). The holder of the option 
has the power of acceptance that is exercised by givine notice within the agreed time. R.H 
Pierce Manufacturing Corp. v. Continental Manz,fnc/uring Co. Inc.? 106 Idaho 342 at 343, 679 
P.2d 142 at 143 (1984). According to solne commentators, an acceptance of an option is not 
effective until it is received by the optionor. &, 3 Coybin On Contracts 11.8 (1996). It would 
be a radical change in contract law if the events of the April 1 1  hearing are held to be the 
acceptance of an option. 
2. 
(Constructive Notice is Insufficient) 
Respondent argues that Ron Ward received constructive notice of Claire Justad's 
intention to exercise the option when her daughter appeared at the April 1 1 hearing. On page 21 
of her brief, Respondent posits the position that the constructive notice placed a duty on Ron to 
inquire of Claire's agent her purpose at the April 11 hearing and he thereby w o ~ ~ l d  have received 
notice that the option was being exercised. As authority Respondent cites three Idaho Supreme 
Court decisions. Those decisions, however, are on adverse possession of real property, 
undisclosed agency, and a vague property description in a prior lawsuit. They are not authority 
for notice of acceptance of a contract offer. 
A ruling that constructive notice of an optionee's intent creates a duty of inquiry upon the 
optionor would be a change in contract law. ' 
C. THE TIUAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE OPTION WAS VALIDLY 
EXERCISED ON JUNE 15 WAS AN INCORRECT API'LICATION OF THE 
LAW. 
The trial court's alternative holding that the letter from Claire's attorney sent by facsimile 
on June 15 (Ex. I) validly exercised the option is wrong for tvvo reasons: (1) it is contrary to the 
law, and (2) it is factually inconsistent. 
1. 
(Time Fixed in Option) 
The 60 days for exercising the option was fixed by the parties. It was a clear statement of 
their intent. By law, compliance with that time period Ivas essential to form a binding contract of 
sale. Southern v. Southern, 92 Idaho 180 at 181, 438 P.2d 925 at 926 (1980). Claire's failure to 
exercise the option within the 60-day period was her ovvn doing. It was her unilateral belief that 
the option should be exercised at a court proceeding (Tr. p. 36? LL 1-5) that led to the delay. 
To change the time agreed to by the parties is to impose an unintended condition on one 
of the parties. 
Of interest on this point is a statement in S~rrheb~ier v. Bollenberg, 127 Idaho 8 1 at 85, 896 P.2d 989 at 993 (Ct. 
App. I995), that the only duty o f  the optionor until the offer is accepted is not to revoke the offer during the lifetime 
of the option. 
L. 
(Inconsistent ~vi th  Findings) 
The alternative ruling that Claire exercised the option by a letter on June 15 is premised 
on the court's finding that Claire had no one upon \\'horn to give notice until Ron's appointment 
as personal representative. But much of the court's oral ruling is an exposition that Claire had 
exercised the option at the probate hearing on April 11. That exposition clearly shows that 
Claire did have someone to notify prior to Ron's appointment.' 
D. STATUTORY PliOVISIONS FOR ATTOIINEY FEES ARE NOT APPLICABLE 
IN THIS CASE. 
(Facts 111 Record) 
Claire Justad testified at trial that she and her husband wanted the real property covered 
in the option agreement so they could leave it to their son as a legacy. That is the purpose for 
entering the option agreement in 1978. (Tr. p. 23, LL 5-16; p. 25, LL-507) There was no direct 
evidence, however, of why Claire attempted to exercise the option in 2006. It can be inferred, as 
the trial court did, that Claire's purpose for attenlpting to acquire the property in 2006 was to add 
to her estate as a legacy for her children. (Supp. R. p. 40, LL 23-26; p. 1 ,  LL 1-2) 
Evidently Claire Justad was not restrained by the nor~existerice of a personal representative. She testified that 
after failing to exercise the option at the April I I hearing she knew Ron had not been appointed personal 
representative. So she engaged an attorney wlio notified Ron's attorney. (Tr. p. 37, LL 4-7) The timing for 
engaging an attorney and for notifying Ron's attorney had nothing to do with the appointment of a personal 
representative. 
2. 
(Code Section 12-120(3)) 
To trigger the entitlement as a commercial transaction under Idaho Code section 12- 
120(3) the gravamen of the lawsuit must be such a transaction. Dertnell v. Kelmzli, 130 Idaho 21 
at 31, 936 P.2d 219 at 229 (Ct. App. 1997). Tlie statute excludes from "commercial transaction" 
those dealings that are for personal or llousehold purposes. The trial judge found that Claire 
sought to acquire the property so she could give it to her children, and it ruled that that was a 
persolla1 purpose. (Supp. R. pp. 40-41) Just as the litigant who sought to refinance his personal 
residence in Bnjrektarevic v. Lighlhouse Horne Lonrts, IIIC., 143 Idaho 890, 155 P.3d 691 (2007), 
was engaged in a personal endeavor, so too was Claire's lawsuit to enforce the option. 
3. 
(Code Section 12-120(1)) 
The trial court denied Claire's claim for attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(1) 
because she had not met the requirements of that code section. (Supp. 4. p. 41, LL 3-8) Among 
the code section's requirements is that a plaintiff make a written demand "for payment" of her 
claim at least ten days before the lawsuit is filed. Presumably, Claire relies on the letter her 
attorney sent by facsimile on June 15, 2006, to Ron's attorney. This is Exhibit I. 
Exhibit I does not demand payliient of any amouut. Rather it claims to exercise the 
option to purchase real property. 
Additionally, the letter was sent on June 15 and the la\\suit was filed on Junc 16. (I<. pp. 
10-28) While Claire filed a second amended coniplaint on Septeinber 20 (R. pp. 108-1 17), the 
prayer for attorney fees in that amended complaint "relates back to the date of ihc original" 
complaint. Civil Procedure Rule 15 (c) 
There is no entitlement to attorney fees in this case under either code sections 12-120(3) 
or 12-120(1). 
The judgment granting specific performance sllo~~ld be vacated because the parties' 
agreement lack essential terms for the sale of real property, because the terms inlplied by the trial 
court were unreasonable, and because the optio~l had not been validly exercised. This case 
should be remanded with directions that the relief of specific performance be denied and that the 
case be dismissed 
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